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gagement with “the real world” and thus ran the risk of being challenged. As such, she once again
sought to develop a standpoint that avoided the pitfalls of both relativism and reductionism.6
The Invention of Modern Science touched on various themes that over the past decades have
become increasingly popular among historians of science. The latter have shown, for instance,
a growing concern for the intricacies of science in nonlaboratory contexts and for the role non-
human actors can play in historical narratives. Historians are reassessing the notion of “whiggish-
ness,” and there has also been considerable soul-searching about the relation historians of science
shouldmaintainwith practicing scientists. Yet, unlike her intellectual fellow traveler Latour, Stengers
has not proven to be a major inﬂuence on these new historical directions. Whereas Latour pro-
vided historians of science with metaphors for understanding historical reality (ranging from “im-
mutable mobiles” to “black boxes”), The Invention of Modern Science particularly invested in a
concept that could inﬂuence their attitude and self-understanding (“humor”). Amongmost historians,
the former seemed more appealing than the latter.
Although The Invention of Modern Science originated in the intellectual climate of the 1990s,
its key concerns are still relevant twenty-ﬁve years later. The rise of “post-truth politics” and the
neopositivist backlash it engenders in some circles threaten a “humorous” approach to science
once again. In such a context, it can be fruitful to reread The Invention of Modern Science.
Historians of science might struggle to understand all of Stengers’s philosophical subtleties (I
readily admit that I was lost on more than one occasion), but they will also ﬁnd a lot worth reﬂect-
ing on. Or, as Latour argued: “You grind your teeth on her argument and you feel much better
afterward.”7
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ipating) the critiques and counterarguments of fellow scientists. The question “What makes some-
thing scientiﬁc?” is at the heart of Stengers’s 1993 book.1 And her reﬂections on the matter may still
inspire historians of science today. To be clear, Stengers does not answer this question. Rather, she
suggests that the question itself is part of the machinery of modern science, as it has developed
since the seventeenth century. The lack of a satisfactory answer in the philosophy of science is,
for her, less important than the centrality of the question itself: it requires one to take a position.
Whether one agrees or not, whether one defends or criticizes science, we all refer to it somehow.
To put it differently: it is almost impossible to escape from the frame that science imposes on us.
In that sense, Stengers argues, we are all “heirs” to the invention of modern science.
Despite these major historical claims, L’invention des sciences modernes never attained the sta-
tus of a “classic” in the history of science. The book was rarely picked up by historians, unlike other
works from the early days of science studies (e.g., Bruno Latour’s books). Stengers’s study is above
all a piece of philosophical scholarship (and—be warned—quite a difﬁcult read). But its disciplin-
ary grounding alone offers insufﬁcient explanation for the lack of attention it has hitherto received.
For theory, whether based in philosophy or in sociology, has often inspired historical research.
Latour’s work, to point to an obvious example, contributed to the success of an “anthropological”
perspective in the history of science. Rereading Stengers’s book, we feel that it deserved more
attention from historians. What intrigued us most is that the book does not take such an anthro-
pological (what Stengers would call an “outsider”) perspective on science. Rather, it considers sci-
ence as the product of a historical and political process in which not only scientists but also
philosophers—and perhaps historians—are themselves embedded.
Science, in Stengers’s view, does not exist outside the ﬂux of human history. It is the use of
scientiﬁc theories and concepts by scientists, scholars, and laypeople that stabilizes and validates
them as scientiﬁc facts, making them more and more indisputable until a new way of seeing
things emerges. Here Stengers suggests an alternative to T. S. Kuhn’s “paradigm shift”: the con-
cept of “event.” An event, such as Galileo’s inclined-plane experiment or the discovery of the dou-
ble helix by Francis Crick and James Watson, determines a “before” and an “after,” transforms
our worldview, and opens a new inﬁnity of questions and possibilities. But it is not the crystalli-
zation of a scientiﬁc truth. An event is only an overture, a debate space. What is scientiﬁc, ulti-
mately, is the theory that will hold through time, resisting controversies and attempts to reduce
it to an opinion; it is what will later be accepted as having made history. Historians of science and
medicine today are familiar with the notion that scientiﬁc concepts are unstable and have a his-
torical thickness. But if, as Stengers asserts, the very “scientiﬁcity” of scientiﬁc facts is created not
by a methodological but by a historical process, what could this mean for our discipline?
But that’s not all. This historical process of science production is also a political process. Schol-
ars and scientists have long since demonstrated that science is never pure, never isolated from
social and political forces. But Stengers goes a step further when she argues that making science is
a way of making politics. To her, science is political, not because it is subservient to or inﬂuenced
by politics but because the (historical) process through which it is created is political in nature: it is
a collective process that entails debates, leads to the veto or ratiﬁcation of scientiﬁc propositions,
and, ultimately, affects society as a whole. Both science and politics are engaged with the question
of how to conceptualize and represent the world; both seek a form of generalization. Politicians
aim to speak not for themselves but for a community of people; scientists seek universal accep-
tance of their theories as truth rather than as mere personal opinion. If we apply this stance to
our own research on the workings of medical and scientiﬁc institutions, Stengers’s claims stand
as an invitation to study these commonalities anew and to scrutinize the smaller, more tangible
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ways in which science resembles politics. Parliamentary tradition in the Western world, for in-
stance, developed parallel to traditions of debate in learned societies and scientiﬁc academies. It
is tempting to push these comparisons further and look at scientiﬁc speech as a political act.
The fact that these ideas, to some degree, still sound new to us is an indication that Stengers’s
work is worth returning to. However, L’invention des sciences modernes is also clearly of its time
and so, in some aspects, proved unexpectedly familiar to us. One example is the way the book tried
to navigate a middle way between two antagonistic views that, up to that point, had heavily in-
ﬂuenced the way scholars and scientists thought about science. The “classic” positivist philoso-
phers, whom Stengers ﬁrst refers to, understood science as being a unique form of knowledge and
practices with the ability to uncover universal truths. Relativist sociologists from the second half
of the twentieth century, on the other hand, approached science as an unstable product of hu-
man interpretations and conventions, no different from any other form of knowledge. Stengers’s
intermediate position echoes historians’ attempts, in the same period, to ﬁnd a middle path be-
tween the early positivist and whiggish history of science and the constructionist, structuralist,
and sometimes stringently anti-institutional approach that deﬁned most pioneering historical works
of the 1950s through the 1980s.
In her act of rebalancing, Stengers points out that skepticism, as it is expressed by sociolo-
gists, among other scholars, is a good thing. In fact, it is an essential component of scientiﬁc prac-
tice, including in the ﬁeld of history. But it also led, in the humanities, to a facile habit of de-
nouncing the subjects of our studies—for example, by analyzing their “strategies” or scrutinizing
their arguments as a form of “rhetoric.” Stengers enjoins sociologists and philosophers of science
to take scientists’ words seriously and rediscover a little bit of the admiration that they inspired in
the past. In the last decades, historians have striven to do something akin to what Stengers pre-
scribes: to understand more fully—in all their nuances and without overlooking the problematic
systems they contributed to—the doings of historical actors that had been grossly caricatured by
antiestablishment and structural analyses of the 1950s–1980s. In the ﬁeld of the history of psy-
chiatry, for instance, we remember being warned during our training years against dismissing
psychiatrists too quickly as either medically ineffective “quacks” or Foucauldian agents of social
control. Trying to assess their work fairly meant seeking to understand their ideas and motives
(and doing the same with other historical actors, such as nurses and patients). By proceeding
in this way, it became possible to complement (not replace!) the narrative of domination with an
alternative history of subjective psychiatric effectiveness, of shared struggles between physicians
and patients to ﬁnd solutions to the pressing issue of mental illness.
Stengers goes more deeply into this relation between scholars (philosophers, sociologists, his-
torians) and the subjects (scientists) whose work they investigate. She proposes several strategies
for diminishing the distance between observers and actors and for taking the latter more seriously.
One of these is humor, an approach she distinguishes from irony. If irony creates distance—his-
torians may write with a certain irony about the past precisely because they have the privilege of
hindsight—humor creates correspondence. The humor Stengers proposes is related to perplex-
ity, to a type of bewilderment about the dynamics of science as something shared between phi-
losophers and scientists, between historians of science and scientists in the past. The idea is not
to laugh at scientists but, rather, to acknowledge—by way of humor—that we cannot escape the
process through which science is constantly being renegotiated and reinvented. Scientists, philoso-
phers, historians—we all take part in it.
But how to put this into practice? In our own research in the history of medicine, we have
found that physicians in the past sometimes tried to answer the same questions we face as histo-
rians. This is true, in particular, for the debate over the status of medicine as an “art” or a “sci-
ence”—a debate that has been going on among doctors at least since the eighteenth century and
that was later picked up by historians. This shared interest across time, we feel, creates a proximity
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between historians and their subjects that sits somewhat uneasily with historians’ self-images as
distant, critical observers. Or, to use the metaphor that became popular with the success of sci-
ence studies, it does not ﬁt well with the image of historians as anthropologists studying distant
tribes. Stengers proposes a different metaphor: that of the political scientist. The latter comments
on, breaks down, and dissects politics but also regards himself as part of the political milieu. Even
if this metaphor does not apply fully to the relation between historians and science, it is challeng-
ing to think about how historical scholarship impacts science, about the way historians, by study-
ing science in the past, contribute to the shaping of its present form. In that sense, Stengers’s philos-
ophy empowers those who plead for a more self-conﬁdent stance on the part of historians in the
debate about the future of the sciences.
As is always the case with philosophical theory, the ideas and concepts put forth in L’invention
des sciences modernes are not directly “importable” into our work as historians. As a result, Stengers’s
book is in equal measure frustrating and inspiring. But even now, her focus on processes, her philo-
sophical take on history, and her will to laugh with scientists force a displacement of perspec-
tive that could be fruitful. Moreover, Stengers’s erudition and knowledge of scientiﬁc theories
feel like an invitation to get closer not only to scientists but to the content of their work as well.
As John Harley Warner pointed out two decades ago, historians’ long-standing feeling of illegit-
imacy when writing about science, as well as their rejection of positivist history, has often led to
an exploration of the context of science rather than to an analysis of scientiﬁc theories.2 Stengers’s
work, in a way, is a reminder that form and content make up an indivisible whole. Stengers has
no clear answers to present, no shortcut, no easy deﬁnition—and she does not seek any. What
she offers is what she hopes for from her peers, scientists and scholars alike: boldness as think-
ers and a recognition of the scientiﬁc practices (and the faith in them) that bind us together.
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